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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Tami Marie Southwick appeals from her conviction for possession of 
methamphetamine, entered upon a jury verdict. On appeal, she asserts that insufficient 
evidence was presented at trial to sustain her conviction and that the district court 
committed fundamental error by not giving the jury a specific unanimity instruction. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On August 18, 2012, Officer Hanners pulled over Southwick for driving a vehicle 
with an expired registration. (Tr., p.11, L.11 - p.12, L.7.) On initial contact, Southwick 
claimed that the car was hers and that she was in the process of getting it registered. 
(Tr., p.14, L.23 - p.15, L.13.) Officer Hanners confirmed Southwick's statements about 
vehicle ownership and checked her paperwork through dispatch. (Tr., p.16, L.5 - p.17, 
L. 7.) As Officer Hanners wrote Southwick a citation for the expired registration and for 
not having proof of insurance, Deputy Wiggins arrived with his drug dog. (Tr., p.19, 
L.19 - p.20, L.14.) The drug dog performed an open air sniff on the vehicle and 
positively alerted on the passenger side door. (Tr., p.46, L.24 - p.47, L.4.) 
To facilitate the drug dog's open air sniff, the officers had asked Southwick and 
her passenger, Mr. Mingo, to exit the vehicle with their dogs. (Tr., p.21, Ls.2-12.) As 
she exited the vehicle, Southwick said, "Because this is not my car, I'm not responsible 
for anything in the vehicle." (Tr., p.21, Ls.13-18.) Officer Hanner reminded Southwick 
that they had already established, through her earlier statements and their investigation 
through dispatch, that it was in fact her vehicle. (Tr., p.21, Ls.19-24.) While Deputy 
Wiggins ran his drug dog around the car, Mr. Mingo asked Officer Hanners if it was 
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illegal to possess scales. (Tr., p.21, Ls.25 - p.23, L.1.) Officer Hanners' follow-up 
questioning revealed that Mr. Mingo and Southwick had a digital scale in the vehicle, 
which the officers later discovered. (Tr., p.23, L.17 - p.24, L.5; p.47, Ls.9-17.) Officer 
Hanners noticed a white powder residue on the scale, which tested positive for 
methamphetamine. (Tr., p.24, Ls.5-11; p.58, Ls.7-14.) A further search of the vehicle 
revealed a baggie of methamphetamine in the passenger door. (Tr., p.25, Ls.10-24; 
p.48, Ls.13-23; p.58, L.18 - p.59, L.7.) 
The state charged Southwick with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.55-
56.) Southwick pleaded not guilty (R., p.74) and stood trial (R., pp.135-38). At the 
close of trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict. (R., p.167.) The district court entered 
judgment against Southwick and sentenced her to a unified term of six years with three 
years fixed, but retained jurisdiction for 365 days. (R., pp.197-201.) Southwick filed a 
notice of appeal timely from the judgment. (R., pp.203-04.) 
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ISSUES 
Southwick states the issues on appeal as: 
1 . Did the state present constitutionally sufficient evidence to support 
the guilty verdict? U.S. Const. Amends. 5 and 14; Idaho Const. Art. I, § 
13. 
2. Did the district court commit fundamental error in failing to give a 
unanimity instruction? U.S. Const. Amends. 5, 6 and 14; Idaho Const. Art. 
I,§ 7. 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Was substantial competent evidence admitted at trial from which the jury could 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Southwick was guilty of possession of 
methamphetamine? 
2. Has Southwick failed to show that the district court committed fundamental error 
by not giving a special unanimity instruction which Southwick never requested and to 




Substantial Competent Evidence Admitted At Trial Supports The Jury's Conclusion That 
Southwick Was Guilty Of Possession Of Methamphetamine 
A Introduction 
The state charged Southwick with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.55-
56.) At the conclusion of her trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict. (R., p.167.) On 
appeal, Southwick argues that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to convict her of 
possession of methamphetamine. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-8.) Review of the trial record, 
however, demonstrates that the jury's verdict is supported by competent evidence 
presented at trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a 
verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller, 
131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 
826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this review, the appellate court will not 
substitute its view for that of the finder of fact as to the credibility of witnesses, the 
weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607. The facts, and inferences to be 
drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding the verdict. Id. In 
determining whether sufficient evidence to support a conviction was presented at trial, 
the Court reviews the evidence that was actually presented to the jury without regard to 
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its ultimate admissibility. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 894, 231 P.3d 532, 539 (Ct. 
App. 2010). 
C. Southwick's Conviction Is Supported By Substantial Evidence 
Idaho Code § 37-2732(c) makes it a crime to possess a controlled substance, 
such as methamphetamine. Constructive possession is shown where the defendant 
has knowledge of the controlled substance and the power and intent to control it. State 
v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 242, 985 P.2d 117, 122 (1999). "Constructive possession may 
be joint or exclusive." kl Sufficient evidence was presented by which the jury could 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Southwick possessed methamphetamine. 
When initially pulled over, Southwick claimed ownership of the vehicle, telling 
Officer Hanner that it had been hers for months, though she had neglected to register it. 
(Tr., p.14, Ls.23 - p.15, L.13.) The police confirmed that the vehicle in fact was 
Southwick's. (Tr., p.16, L.5 - p.17, L.7.) This evidence, that Southwick owned the 
vehicle, supports the inference that Southwick intended to control everything found 
within the vehicle. 
Once the drug dog arrived, Southwick suddenly no longer wanted to be the 
owner of the vehicle, stating, "Because this is not my vehicle, I'm not responsible for 
anything in the vehicle." (Tr., p.21, Ls.13-18.) Of course, the jury was not required to 
accept Southwick's self-serving statement, and the officers had, through their 
investigation, already been able to conclude that the car did in fact belong to Southwick. 
(See Tr., p.21, Ls.19-21.) But that Southwick felt the need to distance herself from 
"anything in the vehicle" is also evidence from which the jury could conclude that she 
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knew there was some sort of contraband in the vehicle. That she felt this need only 
after a drug dog arrived is evidence that Southwick knew the contraband was drugs. 
During the search of Southwick's vehicle, officers located both a digital scale with 
methamphetamine residue on it and a baggie of crystal methamphetamine. (Tr., p.24, 
Ls.5-11; p.25, Ls.10-24; p.48, Ls.13-23; p.58, Ls.7-14; p.58, L.18 - p.59, L.7.) 
Southwick admitted that she knew the scale was in the vehicle. (Tr., p.26, L.22 - p.27, 
L.3.) On appeal, Southwick asserts that the state failed to present evidence from which 
the jury could conclude that Southwick knew that there was methamphetamine residue 
on the digital scale. (Appellant's brief, p.6.) In fact, Officer Hanners testified that the 
scale was contained in a black nylon case and was not recognizable as a digital scale 
unless the case was opened. (Tr., p.65, Ls.17-19.) Upon opening the case, the officer 
could see that the scale was coated with methamphetamine residue. (Tr., p.65, ls.20-
25.) Southwick knew that the black case contained a digital scale. (Tr., p.66, Ls.3-11.) 
In light of Officer Hanners' testimony, that the scale was not recognizable unless and 
until the case was opened, the jury could conclude that Southwick had also opened the 
case and knew about the residue. 
Southwick also asserts that the state failed to present evidence that she had the 
intent to control the methamphetamine. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) Among other things, 
the location of the drugs provides sufficient evidence that Southwick had the intent to 
control them. The scale was discovered slipped in between a break in the front seat. 
(Tr., p.47, Ls.9-17.) It was not visible; an armrest was down covering the scale and the 
officer had to "physically reach in between the seats and remove it." (Tr., p.47, L.18 -
p.48, L.5.) Southwick claimed they only stuffed the scale in between the seats to 
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prevent it from sliding around the dashboard, but if that was true they could have just as 
easily laid it on top of the bench seat. That she stuffed it so deeply in between the 
seats, and then covered it with an armrest, suggests at a minimum that she was 
attempting to hide the scale. In light of the location where officers discovered the 
baggie of methamphetamine, hidden literally in the passenger door panel, the jury could 
infer that Southwick attempted to hide the drugs. That is sufficient evidence from which 
it could conclude she intended to control them. 
There was sufficient evidence to convict Southwick. The evidence presented 
supports the inference that the drugs and scale were hidden in Southwick's car with her 
knowledge, which supports a finding of constructive possession. Because the jury's 
verdict is supported by the substantial evidence presented at trial, Southwick's claim 
that she must be acquitted despite the evidence that she possessed methamphetamine 
must be rejected and her conviction for possession of methamphetamine affirmed. 
11. 
Southwick Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In Her Unpreserved Claim That The 
District Court Erred By Not Giving A Specific Unanimity Instruction 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Southwick asserts that the district court erred by not 
giving a specific unanimity instruction regarding her possession of methamphetamine. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.8-10.) Applying the correct legal standards to the facts of this case 
shows that Southwick was not entitled to a specific unanimity instruction. Because she 
was not entitled to such an instruction, she has failed to show error, much less 
fundamental error entitling her to review of this unpreserved claim. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 
853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 
(2000)). "An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the 
instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party." State v. Shackelford, 150 
Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01 (2010) (citing Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459, 
462, 111 P.3d 144, 147 (2005)). 
C. Southwick Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, In The 
District Court's Not Giving A Specific Unanimity Instruction 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must 
be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson, 
134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000); see also Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 
261 P.3d at 865 ("An error generally is not reviewable if raised for the first time on 
appeal.") (citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003)). This 
same principle applies to alleged errors in jury instructions. See I.C.R. 30(b) ("No party 
may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the party objects 
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to 
which the party objects and the grounds of the objection."); Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 
261 P.3d at 865. Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only 
review an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. .!.9..:.; see also State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
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Southwick did not object to the jury instructions below. Thus, to prevail on 
appeal, Southwick must show that the complained of instruction rises to the level of 
fundamental error. Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Southwick to 
demonstrate that the error she alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [her] unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information 
not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 
P.3d at 980. Because Southwick was not entitled to a specific unanimity instruction, 
she has failed to show error in the failure to give such an instruction, much less 
fundamental error entitling her to review of this unpreserved claim. 
Jury verdicts must be unanimous. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 375, 247 
P.3d 582, 602 (2010); I.C.R. 31(a). However, "[a]n instruction that the jury must 
unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the offense ... is generally not required." 
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 474, 272 P.3d 417, 446 (2012) (quoting State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 711, 215 P.3d 414, 431 (2009)). The exception to this 
general rule is when a defendant commits different criminal acts, each of which 
constitute "separate incidents involving distinct unions of mens rea and actus reas." kl. 
at 475, 272 P.3d at 447. Thus, for example, in Severson, the Court held that the 
defendant, who was charged with murder by poisoning and/or suffocation, or both, was 
not entitled to a special unanimity instruction "[a]bsent evidence of more than one 
instance in which Severson engaged in the charged conduct." Severson at 712, 215 
P.3d at 432; see also State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 977, 188 P.3d 912, 919 (2008) 
(defendant not entitled to a unanimity instruction because "only one criminal act was 
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charged-first-degree murder-and there was no evidence presented of additional 
criminal acts"). 
In this case, the state charged Southwick with a single criminal act, possession of 
methamphetamine. There was no evidence of separate instances of possession of 
methamphetamine upon which the state relied in order to prove that charge. The case 
was based solely around Southwick's single act of possession of methamphetamine on 
or about August 16, 2012. Therefore, Southwick was not entitled to a special unanimity 
instruction. 
On appeal, Southwick argues that having both methamphetamine residue on her 
digital scale and a baggie of crystal methamphetamine constitutes two separate acts of 
possession of methamphetamine. (Appellant's brief, p.10.) It does not. The location 
where Southwick possessed her drugs, whether in her glove compartment, in the trunk 
of her vehicle, in her hip pocket, or anywhere else in the car is irrelevant. The relevant 
inquiry was whether Southwick possessed methamphetamine on or about August 16, 
2012. That she had a baggie of crystal methamphetamine and methamphetamine 
residue on her scale constitutes the crime of possessing methamphetamine; it does not, 
however, constitute two criminal acts of possession. This is especially true in drug 
cases where criminal penalties are often graded to the total weight of the illegal 
substances. (See I.C. § 37-2732B.) 
Even had Southwick requested a special unanimity instruction, she would not 
have been entitled to one. Southwick has failed to show error in the district court's 
omitting an instruction to which she was not entitled. She has necessarily failed to show 
fundamental error entitling her to review of this unpreserved claim. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Southwick's conviction. 
DATED this 24th day of June, 2014. 
=---R~R 
Deputy Attorney General 
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